When a docker compose service has multiple comma-separated domains, the
generate() method was only processing the first domain and truncating the rest.
The issue was that Url::fromString() can't parse comma-separated URLs - it only
parses the first one.
Fixed by:
1. Splitting comma-separated domains with explode(',', $domain_string)
2. Processing each domain individually in a foreach loop
3. Generating preview URLs for each domain using the same template/random/pr_id
4. Joining the results back with implode(',', $preview_fqdns)
This ensures all domains get properly transformed for preview deployments.
Example:
- Original: http://domain1.com,http://domain2.com
- Preview: http://57.domain1.com,http://57.domain2.com
- Before fix: http://57.domain1.com,http (truncated)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixed three potential fatal errors where json_decode could return null:
1. save() method (lines 39-41): Added null coalescing to default to empty array,
and ensure service entry exists before writing domain
2. generate() method (line 56): Changed to use assoc flag consistently and
fallback to empty array
3. generate() method (lines 95-97): Same fix as save() - null coalescing and
service entry initialization
All json_decode calls now consistently:
- Use the assoc flag to return arrays (not objects)
- Fall back to empty array with ?: []
- Initialize service entry with ?? [] before writing
This prevents "Attempt to modify property of null" fatal errors.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The wire:dirty.class was being applied to all form inputs, even those without
wire:model bindings (like readonly fields). This caused the dirty state indicator
to appear on readonly fields when other fields in the form were modified.
Fixed by only applying wire:dirty.class when wire:model binding is present:
- input.blade.php: Moved wire:dirty.class inside @if($modelBinding !== 'null')
- textarea.blade.php: Applied same fix for all textarea variations
- select.blade.php: Applied same fix for select elements
This ensures only fields with actual Livewire bindings show dirty state indicators.
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolved merge conflicts between Livewire model binding refactoring and UI/CSS updates from next branch. Key integrations:
- Preserved unique HTML ID generation for form components
- Maintained wire:model bindings using $modelBinding
- Integrated new wire:dirty.class styles (border-l-warning pattern)
- Kept both syncData(true) and validateDockerComposeForInjection in StackForm
- Merged security tests and helper improvements from next
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Added test to verify parseDockerVolumeString rejects:
- Newline characters (command separator)
- Tab characters (token separator)
Both characters are blocked by validateShellSafePath which is called
during volume string parsing, ensuring they cannot be used for
command injection attacks.
All 80 security tests pass (217 assertions).
Changes:
- Extended validateDockerComposeForInjection to recognize env vars with defaults
- Added pattern check for ${VAR:-default} format alongside simple ${VAR} check
- Maintains consistency with parseDockerVolumeString behavior for string format
Test coverage:
- Added test for safe environment variable defaults in array format
- Verifies ${DATA_PATH:-./data} is allowed in array-format volumes
- All 79 security tests pass (215 assertions)
This allows users to specify environment variables with safe default values
in array-format Docker Compose volumes, matching the behavior already
supported in string-format volumes.
Changes:
- Added tab character ("\t") to dangerous characters list as token separator
- Removed redundant regex-based preg_match block (lines 147-152)
- Characters $(, ${, and backticks were already covered in $dangerousChars array
- Simplified function to rely solely on $dangerousChars loop
Security improvement:
- Tab characters can act as token separators in shell contexts
- Now explicitly blocked with descriptive error message
Tests:
- Added test for tab character blocking
- All 78 security tests pass (213 assertions)
- No regression in existing functionality
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Problem:
- validateVolumeStringForInjection used explode(':') to parse volume strings
- This incorrectly splits Windows paths like "C:\host\path:/container" at the drive letter colon
- Could lead to false positives/negatives in injection detection
Solution:
- Replace custom parsing in validateVolumeStringForInjection with call to parseDockerVolumeString
- parseDockerVolumeString already handles Windows paths, environment variables, and performs validation
- Eliminates code duplication and uses single source of truth for volume string parsing
Tests:
- All 77 existing security tests pass (211 assertions)
- Added 6 new Windows path tests (8 assertions)
- Fixed pre-existing test bug: preg_match returns int 1, not boolean true
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
When catching and re-throwing exceptions, preserve the original exception
chain by passing the caught exception as the third parameter to new Exception.
This retains the full stack trace for debugging while keeping descriptive
error messages.
Changes:
- validateDockerComposeForInjection(): 4 locations fixed
- validateVolumeStringForInjection(): 3 locations fixed
Before:
throw new \Exception('Invalid Docker volume definition: '.$e->getMessage());
After:
throw new \Exception('Invalid Docker volume definition: '.$e->getMessage(), 0, $e);
Benefits:
- Full stack trace preserved for debugging
- Original exception context retained
- Better error diagnostics in production logs
All 60 security tests pass (176 assertions).
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit addresses a critical security issue where malicious Docker Compose
data was being saved to the database before validation occurred.
Problem:
- Service models were saved to database first
- Validation ran afterwards during parse()
- Malicious data persisted even when validation failed
- User saw error but damage was already done
Solution:
1. Created validateDockerComposeForInjection() to validate YAML before save
2. Added pre-save validation to all Service creation/update points:
- Livewire: DockerCompose.php, StackForm.php
- API: ServicesController.php (create, update, one-click)
3. Validates service names and volume paths (string + array formats)
4. Blocks shell metacharacters: backticks, $(), |, ;, &, >, <, newlines
Security fixes:
- Volume source paths (string format) - validated before save
- Volume source paths (array format) - validated before save
- Service names - validated before save
- Environment variable patterns - safe ${VAR} allowed, ${VAR:-$(cmd)} blocked
Testing:
- 60 security tests pass (176 assertions)
- PreSaveValidationTest.php: 15 tests for pre-save validation
- ValidateShellSafePathTest.php: 15 tests for core validation
- VolumeSecurityTest.php: 15 tests for volume parsing
- ServiceNameSecurityTest.php: 15 tests for service names
Related commits:
- Previous: Added validation during parse() phase
- This commit: Moves validation before database save
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Critical Bug Fix:
- isDirty() always returns false in updated() hook
- wasChanged() correctly tracks modifications after save
Files Fixed:
- ServerSetting: Sentinel restart now triggers on config changes
- DeletesUserSessions: Session invalidation now works on password change
Security Impact:
- CRITICAL: Password changes now properly invalidate user sessions
- Prevents session hijacking after password reset
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
